Description: Chapter 9 reviews some of the challenges still facing the Mexican system including retirement age, portfolio risk, INFONAVIT, and the informal market that includes a majority of Mexican workers. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Chapter 1 describes important changes in Mexico in the 1990s such as re-privatization of banks, relaxed financial regulation, membership in NAFTA and OECD, and political change at the federal level. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Mexico substituted its defined benefit system [IMSS] of the formal sector by a defined contribution system in 1997. The initial plan called for buying single premium annuities for the widows and disabled workers under the new system. In the first three years, this market came to occupy a significant part of the insurance sector. Then, the number of workers getting benefits started to fall dramatically. This is the abstract of a paper that shows that such a fall has been a direct result of how the IMSS authorizes the issuance of single premium annuities. The paper analyses the rationale behind such a dramatic change in policy, analyzes various possible scenarios of IMSS strategies, and examines the problem to see if it brings in any long-term benefits to IMSS.

Description: Chapter 5 concludes that the results of the research into the system show that customer retention in the Mexican pension industry is related to specific dimensions of service quality. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: This paper examines the privatized individual pension accounts that are becoming widespread in a number of Latin American countries, and suggests that the experiences in these countries could offer guidance to other countries considering similar privatization.

Description: Chapter 2 examines the long history of social security in Mexico, noting that for most of its history, Mexican social security was highly selective and never universal. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: Chapter 4 describes growth issues including multiple account problems of the old SAR, the amount of money in the AFOREs, and portfolio composition in the AFOREs. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.

Description: This paper models minimum pension guarantee using a simulation approach. Lachance and Mitchell [2002] have shown that it could be important if and when individual accounts are introduced in the United States. This paper's model uses real data from Mexico where individual accounts are already a reality and the minimum pension guarantee is already enshrined by law. The authors calculate the probability of the government needing to honor the guarantee and estimate the cost of such a promise using a real options approach. Higher investment in the stock market turns out to be the key. The higher the proportion of investment allowed by law in stocks, the lower the probability of government support.

Description: Chapter 6 raises the issue that pension privatization does not generate income. Consequently, a way must be found to continue payments to the transition generation still under the old pay-as-you-go system. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1

Description: Chapter 7 develops a model of calculating the cost of managing funds in the Mexican pension system. From Retrospective and Perspective Analysis of the Privatized Mandatory Pension System in Mexico, M-RS02-1.